Starting with 2028 income, Washington will tax income above a $1 million standard deduction at 9.9%. Under existing Washington precedent, I think the tax should be struck down. My prediction is that the Washington Supreme Court will uphold it. Tax rate and start date · Standard deduction · Department of Revenue overview
Article VII of the Washington Constitution requires property taxes to be uniform within the same class and generally caps total property-tax levies at 1% of a property’s true and fair value. Whether those rules apply here depends on whether the new income tax is a property tax.
Washington has tried this before. In 1935, the legislature imposed a tax on the “privilege of receiving income.” The state defended it as an excise. In Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936), the Washington Supreme Court struck it down. The plurality opinion treated a tax on the right to receive income as effectively a tax on the income itself.
The Associated Press called the I‑645 race in favor of keeping the tax. As of the Secretary of State’s November 20, 2026 update, the unofficial statewide count showed 58.02% against repeal. The tax remains on the books. I laid out the broader case in May. I‑645 tracker · November 20 count · May constitutional analysis
The constitutional challenge, Petter v. State of Washington, No. 26-2-00073-20, was filed April 9, 2026, and is pending in Klickitat County Superior Court. The plaintiffs filed a notice for a summary-judgment hearing, which is currently set for February 5, 2027, according to the docket entry reported in the tracker. Counsel for the challengers told The Center Square that the first summary-judgment motion is due December 11, 2026. The Washington Education Association and the Washington State Labor Council have moved to intervene to defend the tax. Klickitat County case information · Tracker litigation update
Start with a pension check
Say you’re a retired Seattle police officer whose annual pension, on its own, falls below the $1 million deduction. You’ve done the work and met the conditions for your pension. Before the first check arrives, you have an enforceable right to be paid. In Bakenhus v. City of Seattle, 48 Wn.2d 695, 698, 296 P.2d 536 (1956), the Washington Supreme Court described a public pension as deferred compensation and treated the obligation to pay as contractual. Article VII defines property to include everything, tangible or intangible, subject to ownership. The right to those payments is a concrete example of what that language can reach.
The pension check illustrates the Article VII question. What exactly is the state taxing when the check arrives? I see two ways the state could win.
First, the court could hold that annual income falls outside Article VII. The state would have to show why your contractual right to future pension payments can be property while the income you receive under that right falls outside Article VII’s broad definition. If the court holds that this annual flow falls outside Article VII, both the uniformity requirement and the 1% property-tax levy limit fall away. To get there, the court would have to reckon directly with Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933), which treated income as property. One ground for overruling precedent is a clear showing that the rule is both incorrect and harmful. In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wn.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970). The court can also overrule precedent if its legal underpinnings have changed or disappeared. Quinn v. State, 1 Wn.3d 453, 470 n.8, 526 P.3d 1 (2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 680 (2024). The intervenors in Quinn argued both grounds. The court classified the capital gains tax as an excise and declined to revisit Culliton. If the court upholds this tax, I expect it to rely on the excise theory below and leave Culliton intact. The difference between the right to payment and the payment itself gives the court little reason to abandon Culliton.
Second, the court could treat receipt as an excise event. RCW 82A.04.030 imposes the tax on the “receipt of Washington taxable income.” That framing echoes the 1935 law the court struck down in Jensen. In Quinn, the court upheld Washington’s capital gains tax because a sale or exchange triggers the tax and the gain measures it. The majority cited Jensen, identifying it as a plurality opinion, in drawing the line between an excise on a specific transaction and a broad tax on receiving income (slip op. at 21, 27). When your pension check arrives, you’re collecting what the city already owes you. If that receipt is enough to support an excise, what remains of the line the court drew in Quinn? Quinn slip opinion
What about Seattle?
Seattle already tried a graduated income tax. In Kunath v. City of Seattle, 10 Wn. App. 2d 205, 444 P.3d 1235 (2019), review denied, 195 Wn.2d 1013 (2020), the Court of Appeals struck it down under Article VII’s uniformity rule. Even if the Supreme Court removes that constitutional obstacle, Seattle and other local governments would still face a statutory ban on personal income taxes under RCW 1.90.100. The statute also bars the state from taxing personal income. It makes an exception for the chapter 82A.04 RCW tax as long as the household standard deduction is at least $1 million. RCW 1.90.100
What to watch
If the court upholds the tax, I’ll look for which premise it adopts. Does it hold that annual income falls outside Article VII? Or does it preserve Culliton and extend Quinn to a broad tax on receiving income? The court’s reasoning will shape what Washington can tax next.
What to assume for 2028
For planning purposes, assume the tax applies to 2028 income. If you’re deciding when to sell a business, recognize a large bonus, or take a retirement distribution, consider modeling the transaction with the tax in place. Washington’s 2028 income tax guide
This post is for general information and does not provide legal advice.